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This paper pertains to the determinants of a youth's education outcomes (as proxied by
education expectations and aspirations). The determinants of a youth's outcomes have
been widely studied, with the literature containing contributions from economists and other
social scientists, e.g., sociologists and psychologists. See Haveman and Wolfe (1995) for a
review. A major ¯nding is that parents' socioeconomic status and behavior have signi¯cant
bearings on their children's education outcomes. See, for example, Sewell and Shah (1968),
Teachman (1987), Kodde and Ritzen (1988), Kane (1994), Astone and McLanahan (1991),
Seltzer (1994), Blau (1999), O'Brien and Jones (1999), and Weinberg (2001). However, the
channels that relate parents' characteristics to children's education outcomes are still not
very clear. The connection is seldom elaborated on, with only a few exceptions, e.g., Becker
(1964, 1981), Becker and Tome (1979), Leibowitz (1974), Astone and McLanahan (1991),
and Weinberg (2001).
In the economic models of Becker (1964, 1981) and Becker and Tome (1979) it is postu-
lated that the connection between parents' characteristics (especially income and education)
and their children's education arises from the parents' genetic endowment and their human
capital investment. Leibowitz (1974) conjectures that the in°uence of parents' education on
children's education outcomes could be through heredity or through the e®ect of parents'
education/income on the quality and quantity of home investment in their children's hu-
man capital (e.g., time input and education resources). His conjecture is supported by his
empirical results.
The more recent study by Astone and McLanahan (1991) empirically shows that children
living with single parents or step-parents during adolescence receive less encouragement and
less help with school work than those who live with both parents. They also obtain evidence
that parental involvement has a positive impact on children's school achievement. The focus
of Weinberg (2001) is on the connection between family income and children's outcomes. His
1hypothesis is that the positive connection between the former and the latter is through the
limited use of pecuniary incentives by low income parents. He demonstrates this connection
by a behavioral model, and his empirical results con¯rm this hypothesis.
The current study's focus is the connection between parents' socioeconomic character-
istics (especially education) on children's education outcomes. We use children's education
aspirations and expectaions as a measure of their education outcomes. Similar to Leibowitz
(1974) and Astone and McLanahan (1991), our purpose is to investigate the channels through
which parents' socioeconomic characteristics a®ect children's education outcomes. This pa-
per explores the hypothesis that parents of di®erent socioeconomic status (especially pertain-
ing to parents' education level) use di®erent parenting practices. It is through di®erences
in parenting style that parental characteristics, at least partially, in°uence the children's
education outcomes.
In the social science literature, there is su±cient evidence showing that parenting styles
are correlated with children's school performance. For example, Dornbusch, et al (1987) ¯nd
that inconsistent and mixed parenting styles are associated with lower grades for adolescents.
Steinberg, et al (1988) obtain evidence that authoritative parenting facilitates school success.
The empirical results of Steinberg, et al (1992) show that authoritative parenting and par-
ents' involvement in schooling are positively correlated with adolescent school achievement,
while parental encouragement to succeed is negatively correlated with adolescent school
achievement.
Our analysis departs from previous studies by focusing on two instruments of parent-
ing, namely positive and negative reinforcements, whose e®ects on adolescents' education
outcomes are rarely investigated. We also examine the association between parents' socioe-
conomic status, especially income and education, and their use of these parenting methods.
By doing so, we attempt to illustrate the connection between family background and chil-
dren's education outcomes, with parenting methods as a mediating factor.
We use adolescents' education expectations (i.e., the level of education that they expect
2to attain conditional on all circumstantial factors) and education aspirations (i.e., the level
of education that they desire to attain ignoring circumstantial constraints) as the measures
of education outcomes. The reason why we use a child's education expectation and aspi-
ration rather than his/her actual education outcomes (e.g., high school completion, college
attendence, test scores, grades, etc.) is that we do not have this information. Most of the
adolescents in our sample are still in school.
Since the expected/aspired education level rather than the expected/aspired number of
years of education is a meaningful measurement unit, we econometrically model the expected
and aspired education levels as ordinal discrete variables via ordered probit models. In the
literature on the determinants of education outcomes the ordinary linear regression model
is often used to model education outcomes. The drawback of the ordinary linear regression
model is that the ordinal nature of education levels is ignored.
A special feature of the current study is the use of econometric techniques which take
account of the possibility that parenting practices are endogenous. The endogeneity of
parenting practices occurs when there are common unobservable factors which a®ect both
the education outcomes of adolescents and the choice of parenting practices. For example,
an adolescent's unobservable ability1 may a®ect both his/her education outcomes and the
way his/her parents interact with him/her. See, for example, Maccoby and Martin (1983).
However, in the education outcomes literature in explaining adolescents' education outcomes,
the endogeneity of parenting practices is seldom accounted for.
To allow for the endogeneity of parenting practices, we adopt a generalized method of
moments approach. By exploiting the ordered probit model's orthogonality conditions, our
GMM procedure follows that of Avery, Hansen, and Hotz (1983) and Poirier and Ruud
(1988). We also follow the guidelines of Wooldridge (1996), who expounds upon the instru-
mental variable approach to a general class of non-linear models.
Based on household data from Taiwan, our results show that parenting practices are
1This is unobservable to the econometrician, but observable to the adolescent and parents.
3important determinants of adolescents' education outcomes. Moreover, parents' education
and health status are important determinants of the education outcomes of adolescents,
both numerically and statistically. This con¯rms our conjecture that parenting practices are
an important channel through which family background a®ects an adolescent's education
outcomes.
The remaining part of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents the econometric method. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 con-
tains a conclusion of the current study.
2 Data
In this study we use survey data from the Panel Study of Family Dynamics (PSFD). The aim
of the PSFD is to understand the structure and evolution of the Chinese family in Taiwan,
as well as the mode of interaction of its members. The questionnaire of the PSFD is designed
in such a way that the special features of the Chinese family in Taiwan are underscored.
The PSFD comprises multi-year panel surveys starting from 1999. The survey adopts a
three-stage random sampling procedure. In the ¯rst stage, a number of geographical areas
(cities or towns, which are the equivalence of \standard metropolitan statistical areas" in
the U.S.) is randomly selected. The probability for a geographical area to be selected is
proportional to its population size. In the second stage, smaller administrative districts
(communities, called \li" in Taiwan, and villages) are randomly drawn from the selected
geographical areas. Again, the probability for a district to be selected is proportional to
its population size. In the third stage, individuals are randomly drawn from the selected
administrative districts. Given Taiwan's population size of twenty-three million, our sample
of around 3,000 is fairly representative. The representativeness of the PSFD sample is
comparable to that of the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
For the year 2001, there are 7,406 families in the PSID sample, which is considered to be
4representative of the U.S. population of 284.8 million.
In February 1999, a nationally representative, random sample of 1000 individuals aged
36{45 was drawn and interviewed. The survey of these respondents is called RI1999. It is
expected that all subsequent surveys will be carried out in February. In the second wave,
conducted in 2000, in addition to interviewing the RI1999 individuals, i.e., the RII2000 sur-
vey, we drew and interviewed a new random sample of individuals aged 47{66. This survey
of the new sample is code named RI2000. This new sample is also nationally representative.
We call members in these surveys the \core respondents." These individuals will be inter-
viewed every year. For RII2000, with an attrition rate of less than 20%, 802 of the RI1999
respondents were successfully interviewed. With a targeted number of respondents of 2000,
the RI2000 survey successfully interviewed 1960 individuals.
From the year 2000 interviews, we collected contact information on the children of the
RII2000 and RI2000 respondents. This enables us to trace and interview the children of
these respondents. We decided to trace children aged 16{23, because these are the years
when they undergo important transitions and make decisions which have major impacts on
their later life. These \children" were interviewed in August 2000. We call members in this
sample the \child respondents" and the 2000 survey CI2000. We have collected the contact
information of 1685 children of the core respondents, but only 1271 of them were successfully
interviewed. The second interviews of the child respondents were carried out in February
2002, to be synchronized with the surveys of the core respondents.
The current study is based on the second wave of the PSFD, consisting of data from the
RII2000, RI2000, and CI2000 surveys. This is the largest cross-section of data available from
the PSFD. After deleting missing values, we end up with 840 pairs of parents and childs.
In this study we are mainly interested in the relationship between a child's education
outcomes and his/her parents' use of positive and negative reinforcement parenting practices.
We use a variable, namely ENCOURAGE, indicating the extent to which a parent praises
or gives awards to his/her children for good behavior as a proxy for positive reinforcement
5practices; and a variable, namely PUNISH, indicating the extent to which a parent punish
(e.g., scolding, corporal punishment, or negative pecuniary incentives) his/her children when
they make mistakes as a proxy for negative reinforcement practices.
It is noted that a respondent of the RII2000 and RI2000 surveys, i.e., a core respondent,
may be the father or the mother of a child respondent. Information on ENCOURAGE and
PUNISH are collected from the core respondents only so that we do not have such informa-
tion on their spouses. In other words, for a child respondent, information on his/her parents'
parenting practices may be obtained from his/her father or mother. To allow the e®ects of a
father's ENCOURAGE and PUNISH to be di®erent from those of a mother, instead of us-
ing ENCOURAGE and PUNISH directly in the regressions, we use ENCOURAGEH and
PUNISHH, and ENCOURAGEW and PUNISHW, which are created by ENCOURAGE
and PUNISH interacting, respectively, with SEX (a variable indicating whether the re-
spondent is a father or a mother):2
ENCOURAGEH = ENCOURAGE £ SEX;
PUNISHH = PUNISH £ SEX;
ENCOURAGEW = ENCOURAGE £ (1 ¡ SEX);
PUNISHW = PUNISH £ (1 ¡ SEX):
We use a child's expected education attainment (EXPECTATION) and his/her as-
pired attainment (ASPIRATION) as proxies for his/her education attainments. This is
because we do not have information on their actual education attainments. Some of the
child respondents have not completed schooling yet. Admittedly, these two variables are not
perfect substitutes for actual education attainments, but we believe that they bear a close
and positive relation with the actual education attainments. To some extent, a child's ed-
ucation expectation and aspiration can predict his/her education attainments. While one's
expected education attainment is his/her prediction of his/her own education attainment,
education aspiration indicates one's ambition, which should bear some positive correlation
with the actual outcome.
2When the respondent is a father SEX = 1, otherwise SEX = 0.
6Our variables of interest (i.e., ENCOURAGE and PUNISH) are attitudinal variables.
With the use of attitudinal variables, interpersonal comparison may be problematic. The
problem arises from the fact that each individual's benchmarks are di®erent. For example,
an individual's de¯nition of \close to actual experience" (i.e., ENCOURAGE=3) may be
di®erent from another individual's. However, by using a 5-point scale and labeling the two
end points as \not close at all" and \extremely close," respectively, we try to set a benchmark
for the respondents. This may alleviate the problem.
The variables used in our empirical analyses are listed and de¯ned in Table 1. The
descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in Table 2. The frequency distributions of
parenting practices are displayed in Table 3, while those of the child respondent's education
expectation and aspiration are in Table 4. The exact wording of the question soliciting
pertinent information from the respondents is also reported under Tables 3{4.
Table 3 reports the frequency distribution of the two parenting practices: ENCOURAGE
and PUNISH. Most respondents stated that they use ENCOURAGE and PUNISH. For
example, 47.37% and 41.65% of male respondents, respectively, and 59.06% and 47.15% of
female respondents, respectively, indicated that the use of ENCOURAGE and PUNISH
is extremely close to their actual experience; whereas, only 3.43% and 4.35% of male respon-
dents, respectively, and 2.23% and 2.23% of female respondents, respectively, stated that it
is not at all close to their experience. The frequency distributions of Table 4 show that most
adolescents (66.91%) expect that they will at least obtain a college education. However,
more of them (79.76%) want to have a college education or above. This shows that to a
certain extent adolescents do realize what constraints they face.
3 Econometric Method
In the empirical analysis we ¯rst estimate the e®ect of parenting practices on an adolescent's
education expectation and aspiration. We then examine the determinants of these practices
7by estimating a model of each practice with the adolescent and his/her parents' character-
istics as explanatory variables. Since education expectation and aspiration and parenting
practices are ordinal variables, we model them using ordered probit models. However, since
it is likely that parenting practices as a regressor in the education expectation and aspiration
models are endogenous, we use a generalized method of moments approach for estimation.
The endogeneity of parenting practices may arise when parents' adoption of parenting prac-
tices is determined partly by children's abilities, which are unobservable to the investigator.
An adolescent's unobservable abilities, of course, have an e®ect on his/her education out-
comes. In this case, we must ¯nd instruments which are correlated with the parents' choice
of parenting practices, but uncorrelated with an adolescent's unobservable abilities.
The estimation of our ordered probit model is via the generalized method of moments
(GMM). Our GMM procedure follows that of Avery, Hansen, and Hotz (1983) and Poirier
and Ruud (1988), who exploit the panel probit model's orthogonality conditions for esti-
mation. By exploiting the orthogonality conditions, such that the numerical evaluation of
high-dimensional integrals is avoided, computation costs are greatly reduced. While Avery,
Hansen, and Hotz (1983) and Poirier and Ruud (1988) apply the GMM approach to the
multiperiod or dependent probit models, we adapt it to the estimation of an ordered probit
model with endogenous variables. In addition, Wooldridge (1996) provides useful a guideline
on the instrumental variable estimation of a general class of non-linear models.
We adopt the GMM approach for estimation mainly because we have several potential
endogenous variables. If we use the likelihood-based approach, we have to model the vari-
able of interest (i.e., EXPECTATION or PUNISH in our study) and all the endogenous
variables simultaneously. By doing so we will be dealing with a high-dimensional, non-linear
system of equations, which is liable to numerical problems (e.g., non-convergence, local max-
imum, etc.). In contrast, the GMM procedure does not require the modeling of endogenous
variables. Moreover, under the likelihood-based framework, a misspeci¯cation (e.g., func-
tional form, distributional assumption, etc.) of any auxiliary models (i.e., models pertaining
8to the endogenous variables) will lead to inconsistency in the parameters of interest. As for
the GMM procedure, consistency in the parameters of interest only requires the correction
speci¯cation of the model of interest and the validity of the orthogonality conditions.
In the following, a concise presentation is given to expound upon the general structure
of the ordered probit model. Our general method of moments approach is given further
below. Let Vi denote an ordinal variable (e.g., an adolescent i's education expectation and
aspirations, or parenting practices) so that
Vi = j if option j is chosen; j = 1;¢¢¢;L + 1: (1)















0 if Y ¤
i < ®1;
where ®j and ¯ are parameters to be estimated, and Xi is a vector of independent variables.
For identi¯cation, we assume ®0 = ¡1, ®1 = 0, and ®L+1 = 1. The probability for Vi to
take the value j is






















where ©(¢) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
We employ this simple structure for modeling parenting practices (i.e., ENCOURAGE
and PUNISH) and estimate the parameters by the method of maximum likelihood.3 How-
ever, for education expectation and aspiration, we estimate them by GMM (see Avery,
Hansen, and Hotz, 1983, Poirier and Ruud, 1988, and Wooldridge, 1996). This method is
explained below.
3The estimation is by means of the statistical package STATA.






1; if Vi · j or
Pk=j
k=1 ®k ¡ ¯Xi < ²i
0; otherwise.
(2)
The error term ²i is unobserved, but we can derive its conditional expectation. That is,

















k=1 ®j ¡ ¯Xi
´i: (4)
See Poirier and Ruud (1988).
We take account of the possibility of endogeneity by employing a (P £ 1) vector of
instruments zi for identi¯cation. Our identi¯cation condition is4
E(z
0
iuji) = 0: (5)
With j = 1;:::;L+1 options for the dependent variable, we have L£P moment conditions.




where Ui ´ fu1i;u2i;¢¢¢;uLig and Zi ´ zi ­ IL, such that Zi is an L £ (L £ P) matrix.
Assuming i.i.d. across i, we can de¯ne the variance covariance matrix of ui as
var(Ui) = ­i; (6)






©s(1 ¡ ©r) if r · s;
ÁrÁs
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10where Ár ´ Á
³Pk=r
k=1 ®k ¡ ¯0Xi
´
and ©r ´ ©
³Pk=r
k=1 ®k ¡ ¯0Xi
´
. See page 167 of McCullagh
and Nelder (1989).





























The coe±cient estimates are obtained by means of the optimization algorithm of Broyden,
Fletcher, Goldfarb, and Shanno (BFGS), which is used to minimize the criterion function in







where R ´ E(Z0
ir i), r i is the Jacobian of Ui, and C ´ E(Zi­iZi).
The validity of the instruments is tested by Hansen's (1982) J-test, which has test statis-
tics as follows.
JN = NQ(¯;®1;¢¢¢;®L); JN » Â
2
M¡R: (10)
Here Q(¯;®1;¢¢¢;®L) is as de¯ned in (8) and under the null hypothesis the moment condi-
tions are satis¯ed, and JN is chi-squared distributed with the degrees of freedom (M ¡ R)
equal to the number of moment conditions M = P £ L minus the number of parameters R.
In the estimation of the models for EXPECTATION and PUNISH, we use the follow-
ing variables as explanatory variables: ENCOURAGEH, ENCOURAGEW, PUNISHH,
PUNISHW (i.e., parents' parenting practices), EDUY RH (i.e., number of years of educa-
tion of the father), EDUY RW (i.e., number of years of education of the mother), AGEH
(i.e., age of the father ), AGEW (i.e., age of the mother ), WPAY (i.e., total monthly income
of the family), NCHILD (i.e., number of children in the family ), SEXC (i.e., gender of the
child), AGEC (i.e., age of the child), and HEALTHC (i.e., health of the child).
5The BFGS algorithm is a quasi-Newton method, which requires information on the ¯rst derivative
only. The BFGS algorithm obtains the Hessian, which requires information on the second derivative in the
Newton algorithm, by approximation. The advantages of using a quasi-Newton algorithm, as compared
with the Newton algorithm, is that (i) it is more stable than the Newton algorithm, and (ii) it is less time
consuming than the Newton algorithm.
11Allowing ENCOURAGEH, ENCOURAGEW, PUNISHH, and PUNISHW to be endoge-
nous, the instruments that we use for identi¯cation in the education outcomes models are
HEALTHH (i.e., health status of the father), HEALTHW (i.e., health status of the mother),
HOURH (i.e., number of work hours of the father), HOURW (i.e., number of work hours
of the mother), NSIBH, and NSIBW (i.e., number of siblings of the father and the mother,
respectively).6 It is expected that all these variables are uncorrelated with the unobservable
determinants of education outcomes, but correlated with ENCOURAGE and PUNISH.7
4 Results Discussion
Determinants of Education Outcomes
The estimation results are discussed in this section. We ¯rst proceed with the results
pertaining to education outcomes as displayed in Table 5 and will examine the validity of
the instruments. The test statistics of the J-test for both models are very low, and with the
p-values being very close to 1, we can conclude that the instruments are valid.
It is noted that the surveys solicit information on parenting practices from a core respon-
dent, who might be a father or a mother of a child respondent. Since the e®ects of parenting
practices of the father and the mother could be di®erent, we thus interact ENCOURAGE
and PUNISH with dummy variables (namely, SEX and (1¡SEX)) indicating whether the
respondent is the father or the mother. By using the interaction terms pertaining to the fa-
ther, namely ENCOURAGEH and PUNISHH, and the mother, namely ENCOURAGEW
and PUNISHW, as explanatory variables, we allow the e®ects of the father and mother's
parenting practices on a child's education outcomes to be di®erent.
6The variables NSIBH and NSIBW are obtained by interacting NSIB, i.e., a respondent's number of
siblings, with SEX, i.e., whether the respondent is the father or mother in the family.
7It is noted that instruments are used to ensure that the orthogonality conditions hold. An instrument
will not have a coe±cient since they do not enter the education outcome equations as a regressor. To
achieve identi¯cation, the number of instruments has to be more than the number of explanatory variables.
The di®erence in the two numbers should be equal to (i.e., just identi¯cation) or larger than (i.e., over-
identi¯cation) the number of endogenous variables.
12The results in Table 5 show that both ENCOURAGEH and ENCOURAGEW have a
positive e®ect on both education expectation and aspiration. The e®ect of parenting through
encouragement or award by the father or the mother on education outcomes is positive. This
result is somewhat di®erent from the results obtained by Steinberg, et al. (1992), who ¯nd
that the e®ect of parental school encouragement has a mildly negative e®ect on adolescents'
school performance.8 To gauge and compare the magnitude of the impact by the father
and the mother, we look at the marginal e®ects of ENCOURAGE on the probabilities of
each category of education outcomes as reported in Tables 6{7. The marginal e®ects of
ENCOURAGEW are sizable relative to those of other explanatory variables.9 In addition,
the marginal e®ects of the mother's positive reinforcement parenting (ENCOURAGEH) are
larger on both education expectation and apsiration than those of the father's. The results
re°ect the fact that mothers play a more important role than fathers in shaping the education
outcomes of children. This is in accordance with the general observation that mothers take
on more parenting responsibility.
Both across mothers and fathers, and between education expectation and aspiration,
the e®ects of PUNISH are more diverse. With respect to EXPECTATION, the ef-
fect of PUNISHH is positive while PUNISHW is negative. However, the e®ects of both
PUNISHH and PUNISHW are statistically insigni¯cant and their marginal e®ects are not
large compared with those of other variables. These results point out that the use of pun-
8It is noted that their measurement of parenting practice is restricted to being pertinent to school encour-
agement and their measurement of education outcome is school performance. The courterparts in the current
study are encouragement/award for good behavior, education expectation, and aspiration. Thus, the results
may not be directly comparable. Steinberg et al. (1992) restrict their attention to parental involvement in
their children's schooling. By contrast, from looking at parents' use of encouragement and punishment in
general, we focus on a broader aspect of parental behavior. The advantage of the Steinberg et al. (1992)
measurement is that evidence on the e®ects of a very speci¯c parental behavior is obtained, whereas, we are
able to examine the e®ects of a broader aspect of parental behavior.
9It is noted that a given explanatory variable's marginal e®ects across all the categories of the de-
pendent variable sum to zero. The interpretation of an explanatory variable's marginal e®ects is illus-
trated by taking the results of ENCOURAGEW as an example in the following. The marginal e®ects of
ENCOURAGEW are negative for EXPECTATION = 3 and EXPECTATION = 4, and they turn pos-
itive for EXPECTATION = 5, EXPECTATION = 6 and EXPECTATION = 7. This indicates that
a higher level of ENCOURAGEH is associated with a higher probability for a child to expect to complete
at least a college eduaction and the probability for him/her to complete junior college or below.
13ishment either by the father or by the mother does not result in any bene¯ciary e®ects on
the education outcomes of a child.
As for education aspiration variable ASPIRATION, with the coe±cient of PUNISHH
being statistically insigni¯cant, the e®ect of PUNISHH is negligible, while that of PUNISHW
is negative and statistically signi¯cant. This suggests that parenting with negative reinforce-
ment has a harmful e®ect on adolescents' education outcomes.
Based on the results pertaining to ENCOURAGE and PUNISH, another ¯nding is
that the e®ect of a mother's involvement in parenting has a much large e®ect than a father's
on a child's education outcomes. We can see this by comparing the marginal e®ects of
ENCOURAGEH and ENCOURAGEW, and those between PUNISHH and PUNISHW.
The marginal e®ects of ENCOURAGEW is much larger than ENCOURAGEH, while the
marginal e®ects of PUNISHW and PUNISHH are comparable for EXPECTATION . As
for ASPIRATION, both ENCOURAGEW and PUNISHW, respectively, have a much
larger marginal e®ect than those of ENCOURAGEH and PUNISHH.
To summarize up, we ¯nd that parenting by positive reinforcement generates positive ef-
fects on children's education outcomes, while parenting by negative reinforcement is harmful
to children's education outcomes.
Now we turn to the results pertaining to other explanatory variables. The other ¯nd-
ings are not surprising as they are mostly in accordance with previous ¯ndings. A child's
father's and mother's education (denoted EDUY RH and EDUY RW, respectively) has pos-
itive e®ects on his/her education expectation and aspiration.10;11 Parents' ages do not have
a statistically signi¯cant impact on their children's education expectation and aspiration.
Family income (denoted WPAY ) has a positive e®ect on both education expectation and
aspiration of a child. This is consistent with the ¯nding in the literature that family income
has a positive e®ect on children's education outcomes (see, e.g., Weinberg, 2001). The num-
10The e®ect of a mother's years of education is statistically insigni¯cant though.
11It is interesting to see that according to the reported marginal e®ects (see Tables 6{7), a parent's
education is a very important determinant of his/her children's education expectation and aspiration.
14ber of children in the family (NCHILD) has a negative (but statistically insigni¯cant) e®ect
on a child's education expectation and a statistically signi¯cant, positive e®ect on his/her
education aspiration. The positive e®ect of NCHILD on ASPIRATION may come from
the existence of competition among siblings. That is, a child may aspire to outperform
his/her siblings by attaining a higher level of education.
As shown by the coe±cient estimates of AGEC, an older adolescent would expect to
attain a higher level of education, while this child will in fact aspire to achieve a lower
level of education. This may be due to the fact that as an adolescent grows older, he/she
may realize that attaining a higher level of education is not as di±cult as he/she previously
thought. However, he/she may not want as much education as he/she previously wished
(that is, when he/she was younger). Male adolescents (i.e., SEXC = 1) in general expect
and aspire to achieve a lower level of education.12 As indicated by the negative coe±cient
of HEALTHC, a child with poorer health (i.e., a higher HEALTHC) will expect to attain
a lower level of education. This re°ect a child's recognition of the physical constraint im-
posed by his/her health condition. However, a child health condition does not a®ect his/her
education aspiration.
Determinants of Parenting Practices
We now turn to the ordered probit results pertaining to the determinants of ENCOUR-
AGE and PUNISH, as presented in Table 8. Since a father and a mother may play di®erent
roles in parenting such that their parenting style may be associated with their socioeconomic
characteristics in di®erent ways, we perform estimations for the male and female respondents
(i.e., fathers and mothers) separately. The estimation results are displayed in Table 8, and
the explanatory variables' marginal e®ects on the probabilities for ENCOURAGE and
PUNISH to take on di®erent values are reported in Tables 9{12.
According to Table 8, a male respondent's education (i.e., EDUY RH) has a statistically
12This ¯nding is consistent with those obtained in developed countries. For example, the empirical results
of Kaestner (1997), Aaronson (1998), Dearden, Ferri, and Meghir (2002), and Pollak and Ginther (2003)
indicate that ceteris paribus females have more favorable education outcomes.
15insigni¯cant e®ect on his use of ENCOURAGE, and it has a statistically signi¯cant, neg-
ative e®ect on his use of PUNISH. The marginal e®ects of EDUY RH on a father's use
of PUNISH are not large relative to those of other variables though. Nevertheless, it has
a statistically signi¯cant and positive e®ect on a mother's use of both ENCOURAGE and
PUNISH. In addition, the marginal e®ects of EDUY RH on a mother's use of ENCOUR-
AGE and PUNISH are quite sizable relative to those of other explanatory variables.
A mother's education (denoted EDUY RW) has a negative e®ect on her use of PUNISH,
whereas it does not have any statistically signi¯cant e®ect on her use of ENCOURAGE .
In addition, her education has a positive e®ect on the father's use of ENCOURAGE , and
its marginal e®ects are not small compared with those of other variables. Since ENCOUR-
AGE and PUNISH have important bearings on the education outcomes of adolescents, the
aforementioned results suggest another channel through which education status is transmit-
ted intergenerationally.
A male individual's age (i.e., AGEH) has a statistically signi¯cant, negative impact on
his use of PUNISH, while having no e®ect on his use of ENCOURAGE. By contrast, a male
individual's age has a positive impact on his spouse's use of ENCOURAGE, but statisitically
insigni¯cant e®ect on his spouse's use of PUNISH. On the other hand, a female individual's
age (i.e., AGEW) has a positive e®ect on her use of PUNISH and a negative e®ect on the
father's use of PUNISH, while having no statistically signi¯cant e®ect on her own use
and the father's use of ENCOURAGE. In other words, an older father is conducive to his
children's expection/aspiration to attain a higher education level through his and his spouse's
parenting style; whereas a mother's age has mixed indirect e®ects on her children's education
outcomes. Nevertheless, from Tables 9{12 we see that the marginal e®ects of AGEH and
AGEW are not large.
According to the coe±cient estimates of HEALTHH, in a family with a healthier father
(i.e., with a lower value of HEALTHH) the mother tends to use ENCOURAGE, while
the father's own use of ENCOURAGE and PUNISH and the mother's use of PUNISH
16are not a®ected by HEALTHH. Moreover, a healthier mother (i.e., with a lower value for
HEALTHW) tends to use ENCOURAGE, while her use of PUNISH and the father's use of
ENCOURAGE and PUNISH are not a®ected by HEALTHW. This portraits an indirect,
positive role played by a parent's healthiness in his/her children's educational attainment.
Gauged by the size of their marginal e®ects, HEALTHH and HEALTHW are important
determinants of parents' parenting style.
We now turn to the results pertaining to hours of labor supply, i.e., HOURH and
HOURW. A father's work hours do not have any statistically signi¯cant impact on his
own use of ENCOURAGE or PUNISH. However, as he works more number of hours,
the extent to which his wife uses both ENCOURAGE and PUNISH will increase. These
results seem to be produced by the fact that a busy husband will shift his parenting respon-
sibility to his wife. By contrast, while a mother's work hours do not have any e®ect on the
father's parenting style, they have a negative e®ect on her own use of ENCOURAGE and
no e®ect on her own use of PUNISH. From the results pertaining to labor supply hours,
we see that having a busy father is associated with mixed indirect e®ects on children's edu-
cation expectation/aspiration, while having a busy mother will produce harmful e®ects on
their education expectation/aspiration. However, the small marginal e®ects suggest that
HOURH and HOURW play only a minor role in determining parenting style.
Total family income (i.e., WPAY ) has a positive e®ect on a father's use of ENCOURAGE
and no e®ect on his use of PUNISH. Nevertheless, total family income has a negative impact
on a mother's use of ENCOURAGE. The marginal e®ects of WPAY are quite small relative
to other variables.
The number of children in the family (i.e., NCHILD), the number of siblings that an
individual has (i.e., NSIB), and the characteristics of a child (i.e., SEXC, AGEC, and
HEALTHC) do not have any statistically signi¯cant e®ect on either ENCOURAGE or
PUNISH for both male and female individuals.
175 Conclusion
The current paper investigates the determinants of education outcomes and parenting prac-
tices. Our objective is to ¯nd a channel through which family background (especially the
parents' socioeconomic background) a®ects the education outcomes of an adolescent. We
conjecture that the style of parenting is one of the channels connecting family background
and adolescents' education outcomes. The current study focuses on two practices: (1) posi-
tive reinforcements, e.g., verbal encouragement and awards, and (2) negative reinforcements,
e.g., scolding, corporal punishment, or negative pecuniary incentives.
We verify our conjecture by empirically estimating a model of children's education expec-
tations and another model for education aspiration with parenting practices as explanatory
variables. We guard against the possibility of parenting practices' endogeneity by adopting
a generalized method of moments approach for estimations. In addition, we also estimate
models of parenting practices using a family's background as explanatory variables. The
empirical work is based on data from Taiwan's Panel Study of Family Dynamics.
The results herein show that parenting practices are in°uential determinants of adoles-
cents' education outcomes. Moreover, parents' education and health status are important
determinants of the education outcomes of adolescents, both numerically and statistically.
This is consistent with our conjecture that parenting practices are signi¯cant channel through
which family background a®ects an adolescent's education outcomes.
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21Table 1: Variable De¯nition
Variable De¯nition
EXPECTATION Child's education expectation. Ranges 1{7;
EXPECTATION = 1 if expects to complete junior high school,
EXPECTATION = 7 if expects to complete a Ph.D. degree. See
Table 4 for details.
ASPIRATION Child's education aspiration. Ranges 1{7;
ASPIRATION = 1 if aspires to complete junior high school,
ASPIRATION = 7 if aspires to complete a Ph.D. degree. See
Table 4 for details.
ENCOURAGE Parent's use of positive reinforcements. Ranges 1{5. See Table 3
for details.
PUNISH Parent's use of negative reinforcements. Ranges 1{5. See Table 3
for details.
ENCOURAGEH ENCOURAGEH = ENCOURAGE £ SEX.
PUNISHH PUNISHH = PUNISH £ SEX.
ENCOURAGEW ENCOURAGEH = ENCOURAGE £ (1 ¡ SEX).
PUNISHW PUNISHH = PUNISH £ (1 ¡ SEX).
EDUY RH Husband's (i.e., father's) number of years of education.
EDUY RW Wife's (i.e., mother's) number of years of education.
AGEH Husband's (i.e., father's) age.
AGEW Wife's (i.e., mother's) age.
HEALTHH Husband's (i.e., father's) health status. Ranges 1{5; very good: 1;
very poor: 5.
HEALTHW Wife's (i.e., mother's) health status. Ranges 1{5; very good: 1;
very poor: 5.
HOURH Husband's (father's) work hours per week.
HOURW Wife's (mother's) work hours per week.
WPAY Total monthly family income. In thousands of New Taiwan Dollar.
As of September 6, 2003, the New Taiwan dollars to U.S. dollar
exchange rate is 34.1.
NSIB Respondent's number of siblings.
SEX Gender of the respondent.
NCHILD Number of children in the family.
AGEC Child's age.
SEXC Child's gender. Male: 1 ; Female: 0.
HEALTHC Child's health status. Ranges 1{5; very good: 1; very poor: 5.
22Table 2: Sample Statistics
Variable Full Respondents Respondents
Sample are Husbands¤ are Wives¤¤
ENCOURAGE 4.2857 4.1808 4.3995
(0.96) (1.01) (0.89)
PUNISH 4.0429 3.9817 4.1092
(1.09) (1.13) (1.04)
EDUY RH 10.4214 10.3776 10.4690
(3.73) (3.43) (4.03)
EDUY RW 9.3905 9.2197 9.5757
(3.52) (3.39) (3.65)
AGEH 48.4060 47.3684 49.5310
(4.81) (3.88) (5.43)
AGEW 44.8917 44.1442 45.7022
(3.60) (3.48) (3.55)
HEALTHH 2.1071 2.0938 2.1216
(0.87) (0.82) (0.93)
HEALTHW 2.1440 2.0892 2.2035
(0.85) (0.85) (0.83)
HOURH 48.1738 52.5675 43.4094
(61.57) (82.14) (23.47)
HOURW 34.2191 27.5675 41.4318
(71.24) (25.53) (98.92)
WPAY 71.7220 69.3032 74.3449
(86.17) (88.82) (83.23)
NCHILD 2.9643 3.0160 2.9082
(0.92) (0.90) (0.94)
NSIB 4.7036 4.7254 4.6799
(1.83) (1.91) (1.74)
AGEC 19.2321 19.0435 19.4367
(1.93) (1.91) (1.92)
SEXC 0.5023 0.5172 0.4864
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
HEALTHC 2.0440 2.0389 2.0496
(0.85) (0.87) (0.83)
Observation 840 437 403
Note: ¤Female respondents.
¤¤Male respondents.
23Table 3: Frequency Distribution| ENCOURAGE, PUNISH
Husband Subsample Wife Subsample
ENCOURAGE PUNISH ENCOURAGE PUNISH
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 15 3.43 19 4.35 9 2.23 9 2.23
2 16 3.66 36 8.24 8 1.99 24 5.96
3 51 11.67 61 13.96 34 8.44 71 17.62
4 148 33.87 139 31.81 114 28.29 109 27.05
5 207 47.37 182 41.65 238 59.06 190 47.15
² Wording of the questionnaire:
On a scale of 1{5, how close are the following statements to your actual experience; \1" stands for \not close
at all" and \5" stands for \extremely close":
(ENCOURAGE) I praise, encourage, or give rewards to my children for good behavior.
(PUNISH) I punish or scold my children when they make mistakes.
² In the estimation of the ordered probit models for ENCOURAGE and PUNISH, we group categories 1{3
together, because of the low frequency of categories 1 and 2.
24Table 4: Frequency Distribution|EXPECTATION, ASPIRATION
EXPECTATION ASPIRIATION
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Junior High School 1 0.12 2 0.24
Senior Vocational High School 5 0.60 4 0.48
Senior High School 64 7.62 45 5.36
Junior College 208 24.76 119 14.17
College 341 40.60 258 30.71
Master's Degree 176 20.95 201 23.93
Ph.D. 45 5.36 211 25.12
² Wording of the questionnaire:
EXPECTATION: Taking into account all factors, what level of education do you
expect you will achieve?
ASPIRIATION: Ignoring all constraints, what level of education do you aspire to
achieve?
² In the estimation of the models for EXPECTATION and ASPIRATION, we group
the categories \Junior High School," \Senior Vocational High School", and \Senior High
School" together, because of the low frequency of the three categories.












EDUY RH 0.8904¤¤ 0.6660¤¤
(75.60) (53.86)






















J-Test Statistic 0.1148 0.1436
(0.990) (0.9861)
Note: yAsymtotic t-statistics in parentheses.
¤¤Statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.
¤Statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level.
ENCOURAGEH = ENCOURAGE £ SEX
ENCOURAGEW = ENCOURAGE £ (1 ¡ SEX)
PUNISHH = PUNISH £ SEX
PUNISHW = PUNISH £ (1 ¡ SEX)
26Table 6: Marginal E®ects on EXPECTATION.
Variable EXPECTATION = 3 EXPECTATION = 4 EXPECTATION = 5 EXPECTATION = 6 EXPECTATION = 7
ENCOURAGEH -0.0091 -0.0162 0.0029 0.0159 0.0065
ENCOURAGEW -0.0157 -0.0280 0.0050 0.0276 0.0112
PUNISHH -0.0022 -0.0039 0.0007 0.0039 0.0016
PUNISHW 0.0021 0.0037 -0.0007 -0.0037 -0.0015
EDUY RH -0.1131 -0.2017 0.0357 0.1984 0.0807
EDUY RW -0.0030 -0.0053 0.0009 0.0052 0.0021
AGEH -0.0071 -0.0127 0.0023 0.0125 0.0051
AGEW -0.0061 -0.0109 0.0019 0.0108 0.0044
WPAY -0.0104 -0.0186 0.0033 0.0183 0.0074
NCHILD 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0005
SEXC 0.0174 0.0310 -0.0055 -0.0305 -0.0124
AGEC -0.0202 -0.0360 0.0064 0.0354 0.0144
HEALTHC 0.0075 0.0134 -0.0024 -0.0132 -0.0054
Note:









where ¹ X stands for the mean of the vector of regressors and ¹ z is the mean of zi. That is, the marginal probabilities are
evaluated at the mean of the regressors. If zi is binary, then the marginal e®ect equals
¹j









27Table 7: Marginal E®ects on ASPIRATION.
Variable ASPIRATION = 3 ASPIRATION = 4 ASPIRATION = 5 ASPIRATION = 6 ASPIRATION = 7
ENCOURAGEH -0.0065 -0.0095 -0.0076 0.0058 0.0179
ENCOURAGEW -0.0157 -0.0226 -0.0180 0.0137 0.0426
PUNISHH -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0010
PUNISHW 0.0091 0.0131 0.0104 -0.0079 -0.0247
EDUY RH -0.0741 -0.1065 -0.0851 0.0647 0.2009
EDUY RW -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0039
AGEH 0.0051 0.0074 0.0058 -0.0045 -0.0139
AGEH -0.0059 -0.0085 -0.0068 0.0051 0.0160
WPAY -0.0050 -0.0072 -0.0058 0.0044 0.0136
NCHILD -0.0076 -0.0109 -0.0087 0.0066 0.0205
SEXC 0.0065 0.0093 0.0074 -0.0057 -0.0176
AGEC 0.0542 0.0779 0.0622 -0.0474 -0.1470
HEALTHC -0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0026 0.0020 0.0063
Note: See Table 6.
28Table 8: Ordered Probit Results for ENCOURAGE and PUNISH.
Father Subsample Mother Subsample
ENCOURAGE PUNISH ENCOURAGE PUNISH
Constant -2.3423¤¤ -2.0415¤¤ -1.5431 -4.257¤¤
(-2.58) (-2.33) (-1.46) (-4.37)
EDUY RH -0.0281 -0.0359¤ 0.0895¤¤ 0.0574¤¤
(-1.30) (-1.67) (4.01) (2.78)
EDUY RW 0.0506¤¤ -0.0068 0.0062 -0.0514¤¤
(2.19) (-0.30) (0.25) (-2.21)
AGEH -0.0054 -0.0521¤¤ 0.0276¤ -0.0099
(-0.26) (-2.55) (1.76) (-0.73)
AGEW -0.0186 0.0456¤¤ -0.0121 -0.0603¤¤
(-0.80) (2.00) (-0.51) (-2.70)
HEALTHH -0.0195 0.0939 -0.1935¤¤ 0.0567
(-0.27) (1.30) (-2.73) (0.87)
HEALTHW 0.0658 0.0351 -0.2019¤¤ -0.0720
(0.93) (0.51) (-2.47) (-0.97)
HOURH 0.0009 0.0009 0.0065¤¤ -0.0056¤¤
(1.27) (1.30) (2.23) (-2.09)
HOURW -0.0018 0.0003 -0.0013¤¤ -0.0007
(-0.85) (0.18) (-2.28) (-1.36)
WPAY 0.0010¤ -0.0003 -0.0020¤¤ 0.0000
(1.78) (-0.55) (-2.82) (0.03)
NCHILD -0.0307 -0.0223 -0.0066 0.0710
(-0.43) (-0.32) (-0.09) (0.99)
NSIB -0.0021 0.0073 0.0580 0.0129
(-0.07) (0.25) (1.52) (0.36)
SEXC -0.0380 -0.0005 -0.1014 -0.0928
(-0.34) (-0.01) (-0.81) (-0.80)
AGEC 0.0082 -0.0200 -0.0336 0.0260
(0.27) (-0.67) (-0.95) (0.80)
HEALTHC 0.0062 0.0606 -0.012 0.0164
(0.10) (0.96) (-0.17) (0.23)
®2 -1.7357¤ -1.5024¤ -0.8462 -3.475¤¤
(-1.91) (-1.72) (-0.80) (-3.58)
®3 -0.7393 -0.6372 0.2313 -2.686¤¤
(-0.82) (-0.73) (0.22) (-2.78)
Log likelihood -490.91 -540.45 -362.75 -467.43
Â2
17 31.18 24.59 88.86 47.63
[0.0190] [0.1043] [0.0000] [0.0001]
Observation 437 437 403 403
Note: yAsymtotic t-statistics in parentheses.
¤¤Statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.
¤Statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level.
29Table 9: Marginal E®ects on the Father Subsample's ENCOURAGE.
Variable ENCOURAGE=2 ENCOURAGE=3 ENCOURAGE=4 ENCOURAGE=5
EDUY RH 0.0034 0.0038 0.0038 -0.0111
EDUY RW -0.0062 -0.0069 -0.0070 0.0201
AGEH 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0021
AGEW 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0074
HEALTHH 0.0024 0.0026 0.0027 -0.0078
HEALTHW -0.0081 -0.0089 -0.0091 0.0262
HOURH -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003
HOURW 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007
WPAY -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004
NCHILD 0.0037 0.0042 0.0042 -0.0122
NSIB 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0008
SEXC 0.0046 0.0051 0.0052 -0.0151
AGEC -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0032
HEALTHC -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0024
Note: See Table 6.
30Table 10: Marginal E®ects on the Father Subsample's PUNISH.
Variable ENCOURAGE=2 ENCOURAGE=3 ENCOURAGE=4 ENCOURAGE=5
EDUY RH 0.0070 0.0045 0.0023 -0.0139
EDUY RW 0.0013 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0026
AGEH 0.0102 0.0065 0.0034 -0.0203
AGEW -0.0090 -0.0057 -0.0030 0.0177
HEALTHH -0.0185 -0.0118 -0.0062 0.0366
HEALTHW -0.0069 -0.0044 -0.0023 0.0136
HOURH -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003
HOURW -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002
WPAY 0.0001 0.00004 0.00002 -0.0001
NCHILD 0.0044 0.0028 0.0014 -0.0087
NSIB -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0028
SEXC 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 -0.0002
AGEC 0.0039 0.0025 0.0013 -0.0078
HEALTHC -0.0119 -0.0076 -0.0040 0.0236
Note: See Table 6.
31Table 11: Marginal E®ects on the Mother Subsample's ENCOURAGE.
Variable ENCOURAGE=2 ENCOURAGE=3 ENCOURAGE=4 ENCOURAGE=5
EDUY RH -0.0045 -0.0103 -0.0197 0.0346
EDUY RW -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0013 0.0024
AGEH -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0061 0.0106
AGEW 0.0006 0.0014 0.0026 -0.0047
HEALTHH 0.0098 0.0223 0.0427 -0.0749
HEALTHW 0.0102 0.0233 0.0446 -0.0781
HOURH -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0014 0.0025
HOURW 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005
WPAY 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0007
NCHILD 0.0003 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0025
NSIB -0.0029 -0.0066 -0.0128 0.0224
SEXC 0.0051 0.0117 0.0223 -0.0392
AGEC 0.0017 0.0038 0.0074 -0.0130
HEALTHC 0.0006 0.0014 0.0027 -0.0048
Note: See Table 6.
32Table 12: Marginal E®ects on the Mother Subsample's PUNISH.
Variable ENCOURAGE=2 ENCOURAGE=3 ENCOURAGE=4 ENCOURAGE=5
EDUY RH -0.0074 -0.0102 -0.0051 0.0228
EDUY RW 0.0066 0.0091 0.0045 -0.0204
AGEH 0.0012 0.0017 0.0008 -0.0039
AGEW 0.0078 0.0107 0.0053 -0.0239
HEALTHH -0.0073 -0.0101 -0.0050 0.0225
HEALTHW 0.0093 0.0128 0.0064 -0.0286
HOURH 0.0007 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0022
HOURW 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
WPAY -2.35e-6 -3.22e-6 -1.60e-6 7.17e-6
NCHILD -0.0092 -0.0126 -0.0063 0.0282
NSIB -0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0011 0.0051
SEXC 0.0121 0.0165 0.0082 -0.0369
AGEC -0.0033 -0.0046 -0.0023 0.0103
HEALTHC -0.0021 -0.0029 -0.0014 0.0065
Note: See Table 6.
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